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IMPLEMENTING SYMMETRIC TREATMENT
OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTS IN
BANKRUPTCY AND BANK RESOLUTION
Edward J. Janger* and John A. E. Pottow**
INTRODUCTION
Financial contracts come in many forms and serve many functions in
both the financial system and the broader economy. Repos secured by U.S.
Treasury securities act as money substitutes and can play an important role
as part of the money supply, while similarly structured repos, secured by
more volatile collateral, may be used as speculative devices or hedges.
Swaps can be used to insure against various types of market risk, from
interest rates to oil prices, or they can operate as vehicles for highly
leveraged investments. The parties to these instruments are sometimes
major financial institutions and, other times, ordinary businesses. Default
poses differing risks to the financial system depending upon the type of
instrument and the nature of the parties.1
Under current U.S. law, however, financial contracts receive one of
only two radically different types of treatment in insolvency depending on
the identity of the insolvent party: banks and systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs) get one treatment; everyone else gets another.2
* David M. Barse Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
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1. Where the instrument is an important part of the money supply, such as treasury repos,
then protection of liquidity may be crucial. On the other hand, the stable value of the collateral
(treasuries) may mean that Nsystemic8 liquidity of such repos will not be threatened by bankruptcy.
See Edward R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe & Christopher S. Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe
Harbors, 69 BUS. LAW. 1015, 1017 (2014) (NSafe harbors for . . . repos can be justified on
grounds that have nothing to do with systemic risk management and they are at base sufficiently
liquid and likely to retain fundamental value in a crisis that they pose no real systemic risk.8).
Where the instrument is speculative, delay may have an effect on the value of the instrument to
the parties. But since such instruments are not serving as money substitutes, this volatility may not
be a systemic concern.
2. Compare Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(providing resolution procedures for FDIC insured banks), and Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 201R214, 124 Stat.
1376, 1442R1518 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381R5394 (2012)) (providing resolution
procedures for systemically significant financial institutions), with the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.
§ 109 (2012) (permitting bankruptcy relief for individual and enterprise debtors); see also FIN.
STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS (2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf [hereinafter FIN.
STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES] (focusing on the failure and resolution of financial
institutions); INT4L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW [UNIDROIT], PRINCIPLES ON
THE OPERATION OF CLOSE-OUT NETTING PROVISIONS (2013) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
PRINCIPLES], http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/netting/netting-principles2013-e.pdf
(focusing on insolvency in the ordinary economy).
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More specifically, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
resolves banks under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA), 3 and, unless an orderly resolution can be
accomplished in bankruptcy, the FDIC also now has authority to resolve
SIFIs under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.4 Everyone else makes use of the
Bankruptcy Code.5
These two regimesPNbank resolution8 and Nbankruptcy8Pfocus on
two different types of systemic risk associated with financial contracts.
Bankruptcy focuses on the risk to capital markets if financial contracts
cannot clear quickly. Bank resolution focuses on bank runsPthe danger of
the contracts clearing too quickly. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Code seeks
to preserve the liquidity of certain instruments by exempting them from
kl0I+(-)Th4* automatic stay and avoidance powers,6 while bank insolvency
law seeks to preserve asset value of a struggling bank itself by facilitating
orderly transfer of the bank4s financial contracts (and other assets) to a
solvent party.
The key practical difference between the regimesPstemming from
these different orientationsPis their respective treatment of contractual
early-termination rights. Early termination or Iipso facto5 clauses treat the
filing of bankruptcy as a default per se and allow for immediate termination
of a financial contract. They are often accompanied by a Nwalkaway clause8
that extinguishes any net payment obligation of the nonbankrupt party.
These clauses may preserve the liquidity and value of particular types of
financial instruments for the nonbankrupt party, but they can also work
together to destroy the value of any Nin the money8 derivative position held
by the debtor. Bankruptcy law gives effect to early termination rights in the
interest of liquidity. Bank insolvency law, by contrast, modifies them in the
interest of value preservation and financial market stability.7
A primary goal of the bank resolution regime is to promote the stability
of the financial system by preventing bank runs (contagion). Bank
insolvency law thus briefly stays early contractual terminations that would
otherwise be triggered by the commencement of a receivership. This so-
called Nshort stay8 stops a run on, and preserves the value of, )LQ kl0I4*
3. See FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811R1835a.
4. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201R214, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381R5394. The Dodd-Frank Act
expresses a preference that SIFIs should be resolved in bankruptcy, but if the FDIC determines
that such orderly resolution in bankruptcy is impossible, it grants the FDIC the power to use its
NOrderly Liquidation Authority8 to address the SIFI4s insolvency. Significantly, for reasons
discussed below, we think it unlikely that large financial firms will be resolvable in bankruptcy
without the statutory revisions we suggest in this Article.
5. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b).
6. See discussion infra notes 46R49.
7. Defenders of the bankruptcy safe harbors, discussed immediately below, of course would
say that their liquidity-preserving function also is in the broader service of financial market
stability, which simply underscores the differing perspectives of the two systems toward financial
risk.
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assets for the benefit of )LQ kl0I4* stakeholders and the economy generally
(value preservation). Early termination rights, if exercised, might allow a
counterparty to escape its obligations on a financial contract that has value
to the debtor. A brief suspension of those rights, however, enables the
orderly transfer of the derivatives portfolio to a solvent and creditworthy
entity that can then perform the contract. This preserves the financial
attributes of the instrument for both parties.8 This process actually has three
steps. First, termination is briefly stayed. Second, the bank4s assets are
divided into Ngood8 and Nbad8 assets. Third, the good assets are transferred
in a timely fashion from the failed institution to a solvent one capable of
performing the contract. 9 Upon transfer, the commencement of the
receivership is no longer a basis for exercising the early termination rights
as the counterparty is assured the benefit of its bargain under the financial
contract.10 Thus, as a practical matter, in bank resolution, and under the
8. See FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(9)R(10) (2012) (suspending early termination rights
against banks); see also Dodd-Frank Act § 210, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)R(9) (2012) (suspending
early termination rights against SIFIs). Interestingly, when the definition of Nqualified financial
contract8 was expanded in 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
expressly rendered walkaway clauses unenforceable where the FDIC was involved, but left them
in place for ordinary debtors. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
(BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 902, 119 Stat. 23, 159R60 (codified at 12 U.S.C § 1821
(2012)).
9. The bad assets are left behind for takeover by the FDIC. For an overview of the FDIC
resolution process, see FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 8R14 (2014),
https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/drr_handbook.pdf [hereinafter RESOLUTIONSHANDBOOK].
10. Section 210(c)(10) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides, for example:
(B) Certain rights not enforceable
(i) Receivership
A person who is a party to a qualified financial contract with a covered financial company
may not exercise any right that such person has to terminate, liquidate, or net such contract
under paragraph (8)(A) solely by reason of or incidental to the appointment under this
section of the Corporation as receiver for the covered financial company (or the insolvency
or financial condition of the covered financial company for which the Corporation has
been appointed as receiver)P
(I) until 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on the business day following the date of the
appointment; or
(II) after the person has received notice that the contract has been transferred pursuant
to paragraph (9)(A).
Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(10). Section 210(c)(16) further provides:
The Corporation, as receiver for a covered financial company . . . shall have the power
to enforce contracts of subsidiaries or affiliates of the covered financial company . . .
notwithstanding any contractual right to cause the termination, liquidation, or
acceleration of such contracts based solely on the insolvency, financial condition, or
receivership of the covered financial company, if . . . such guaranty or other support and
all related assets and liabilities are transferred to and assumed by a bridge financial
company . . . or . . . the Corporation, as receiver, otherwise provides adequate protection
with respect to such obligations.
Codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(16).
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Orderly Liquidation Authority of Dodd-Frank (OLA), early termination
rights are never actually exercised, and a bank run is averted.
In bankruptcy, there is no such short stay. Quite the oppositePthe so-
called Nbankruptcy safe harbors8 identify classes of eligible financial
instruments and exempt those instruments from bankruptcy4* automatic
stay entirely, thus permitting immediate exercise of early termination rights.
These safe harbors consequently permit creditors to do three things that
would otherwise be prohibited by the automatic stay: (1) terminate the
financial contract; (2) exercise setoff rights; and (3) sell any of the debtor4s
property that serves as collateral to secure the contract.11 These rights are
collectively referred to as Ncloseout netting.8 12 Closeout netting may,
broadly speaking, help preserve the liquidity of certain types of financial
instruments, but it is inconsistent with the broader goals of Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, such as debtor value maximization and equal
treatment of creditors. Even more troublingly from the perspective of
coherent regime integration, it is inconsistent with bank resolution4s goals
of stopping bank runs and preserving the value of a failing entity4s
derivatives portfolio. For better or worse, however, Congress has enshrined
the safe harbors in the Bankruptcy Code, giving rise to a marked asymmetry
between the treatments of financial contracts: suspension of early
termination rights in bank resolution, yet enthusiastic vindication of those
same rights in bankruptcy.
The entrenchment of this asymmetry is deep-seated; commentators and
international institutions alike have endorsed this exceptional treatment of
financial contracts in bankruptcy under the safe harbors. Indeed, this right
to immediate termination under the safe harbors, in the name of liquidity,
seems to be cast by many as nearly essential to preserving financial market
stability.13 For example, the value of this right is extolled in the UNIDROIT
Principles on Closeout Netting, as well as in pre-crisis documents, such as
the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and the pre-revision World Bank ICR
Standard C10.4.14
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6)R(7) (2012) (exempting certain setoff rights against financial
contracts from the automatic stay); see also id. §§ 546(e)R(g), 555R556, 559 (exempting certain
payments by debtor on financial contracts from the trustee4s avoidance powers).
12. See, e.g., UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 1R2.
13. See, e.g., Philipp Paech, The Value of Financial Market Insolvency Safe Harbours, 36
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 28 (2016) (N[S]afe harbours allow for exponentially increased market
liquidity based on the highly efficient use of assets for purposes of collateralisation. Literally any
type of asset, regardless of its legal nature, can now be turned into cash using repo or derivatives
transactions.8).
14. See, e.g., UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, para. 5 (NRegulatory authorities (most
recently, the Financial Stability Board and the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision) strongly encourage the use of such close-out netting
provisions (alongside collateral) because of their beneficial effects on the stability of the financial
system.8); U.N. COMM4N ON INT4L TRADE L., UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY
LAW, recs. 101R07, U.N. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE GUIDE]; see also
2015] Implementing Symmetric Treatment 159
We align with a growing chorus of commentators who question the
accuracy of the assertion that closeout netting enhances market stability.15
Indeed, recent experience in Lehman Brothers demonstrates that immediate
termination may actually increase, rather than reduce, systemic risk by
exacerbating contagion, and, worse yet, make it virtually impossible for
financial firms to restructure in bankruptcy. While respect of setoff rights is
essential to allowing financial counterparties to manage their derivatives
exposure /0 l N0Q)8 kl*K*, allowing those rights to be exercised
immediately can be problematic. NRespect8 /O *Q)/OO +KML)* l0S )LQ Ntiming8
of setoff are distinct issues: there is no intrinsic reason that setoff rights
need to be instantly exercisable to keep systemic risk at a manageable level.
Moreover, while immediate termination may well preserve the liquidity of
certain classes of financial instruments, it does so only by permitting a run
on the particular debtor4s assets, which may destroy the debtor and in turn
have its own market-destabilizing effects. Left unprotected by even a brief
stay, Lehman could not reorganize, conduct a going concern sale, or
preserve the value of its derivatives portfolio. And the collapse of Lehman
certainly created significant instability in the financial system. Thus, at least
where the firm is large enough, the negative systemic effect of allowing a
run on the firm may offset any benefit to be gained by allowing early
termination. Some delay in termination might thus be systemically salutary.
Although many join us in doubting the wisdom of the bankruptcy safe
harbors, there is little agreement on what should be done. While some
advocate outright repeal of these statutory provisions, others note that at
least some financial instruments could have their liquidity attributes
seriously jeopardized in the absence of some exceptional treatment in
bankruptcy.16 This Article accepts, for the purposes of this discussion at
least, that there is a class of financial contracts that require special treatment
in bankruptcy for systemic reasons. Precisely which instruments should
receive that special treatment, and for which policy reasons, we leave to
Proposed Revisions to the ICR Standard, WORLD BANK C10.4 (Mar. 17, 2015),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/Expert_Group_Working_Draft_As_Of_
March_17(Compared_to_Current_Standard).pdf. As discussed in the Symposium Introduction,
l0S K0 <+/OQ**/+ V/IlH4* T/0)+Kk()K/0c the World Bank Standard C10.4 was recently revised to
permit a short-stay approach.
15. For an excellent review of, and addition to, this literature, see Riz Mokal4s contribution to
this symposium. Rizwaan J. Mokal, Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of
Financial Contracts, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 15 (2015). For further insights, also see
Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 123 (2010)
[hereinafter Lubben, Safe Harbors]; Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market1s Payment Priorities as
Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011).
16. For example, )LQ N*lOQ l**Q)*8 SQ*T+KkQS kh #00l \QH-Q+0 and Erik Gerding in their
contribution to this symposium provide an illustration of financial instruments that, if they are to
be cash-HKIQc 2lh 0QQS */2Q +QHKQO O+/2 kl0I+(-)Th4* k+/lS *)lha Anna Gelpern & Erik F.
Gerding, Private and Public Ordering in Safe Asset Markets, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
97 (2015).
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another day. Instead, we seek to address two problems with the current
asymmetric treatment of those instruments subject to the bankruptcy safe
harbors. First, as Lehman demonstrated, the immediate termination of
financial contracts under the bankruptcy safe harbors makes it virtually
impossible to resolve financial institutions in bankruptcy; and second, as
one of us developed more fully in a previous article, the asymmetry itself
creates a variety of arbitrage opportunities and is therefore problematic in
its own right.17
We therefore explore how best to implement a symmetric N*L/+) *)lh8
approach that harmonizes the bank resolution and bankruptcy regimes. In
choosing the short stay regime of bank resolution over the bankruptcy N*lOQ
Ll+k/+8 approach as the model for harmonization, we observe that the more
orderly bank/SIFI approach has allowed for greater asset value preservation
in banking cases than the immediate termination rule in bankruptcy.18 We
also note that the financial markets have, for years, tolerated the short stay
of the bank resolution regime without apparent catastrophe to financial
market liquidity.19
Our goal in advocating this symmetric approach is modest: to offer a
technical roadmap toward a treatment of financial contracts in bankruptcy
that is symmetric to their treatment under bank insolvency law and
workable in the enterprise context. In doing so, we seek to respond to two
specific critiques: (1) that any stay in bankruptcy is too long and will have
unacceptable systemic risk consequences; and (2) that two days is too short
to accomplish an orderly transfer of a derivative portfolio in a case where
the debtor is not a bank. While these concerns are important, we think they
can be addressed. The key, we contend, to the successful transplant of the
bank resolution law short stay into bankruptcy is adequate assurance of
future performance of the financial contract portfolio (which can be
accomplished through the use of so-TlHHQS Ndebtor-in-possession8 /+ NpZ<8
financing as a financial backstop).
This Article proceeds in three steps. Part I contrasts the bank insolvency
treatment of financial contracts with the approach in bankruptcy and notes
that the bank resolution regime appears better tailored to preserve the value
of these contracts while minimizing disruption to the financial system. Part
II explores how the bank resolution approach could be replicated in
17. See Edward J. Janger, Arbitraging Systemic Risk: System Definition, Risk Definition,
Systemic Interaction, and the Problem of Asymmetric Treatment, 92 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 217,
223 (2014).
18. See Mark Roe & Stephen Adams, Restructuring Failed Financial Firms in Bankruptcy:
Learning from Lehman, 32 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with authors) (NAlvarez
& Marsal, Lehman4s restructuring advisor, estimated that the disorderly close-outs of Lehman4s
derivative portfolio caused the Lehman estate to lose at least $50 billion in portfolio value, and
maybe more.8).
19. The one-day stay of FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(G)(ii) (2012), has been in effect
since 1991 and has not yet caused a market collapse even though numerous banks have failed.
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bankruptcy, identifying the changes that would be necessary to current law,
both to preserve value and to protect the legitimate expectations of
nonbankrupt counterparties (i.e., assuring derivative counterparties the
benefit of their bargain while preventing opportunistic breach). Finally, Part
III briefly explores whether the same approach could be used, in appropriate
circumstances, to allow financial contracts to be assumed and performed by
the debtor itself. The Article concludes by detailing the relatively modest
set of changes to current bankruptcy law that would be required to
implement symmetric treatment of financial contracts in bankruptcy and
bank resolution.
I. ASYMMETRIC TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL CONTRACTS #
CONTRASTING BANK RESOLUTIONWITH BANKRUPTCY
A. THEMECHANICS OF THE BANKRESOLUTIONREGIME
Banks hold financial contracts and derivatives in their portfolios in the
form of options, swaps, repos, credit default agreements, and so on. These
contracts are sometimes held as assets on a bank4s books as a money
substitute and are sometimes used as hedges to balance other risks in the
bank4s portfolio. These contracts all share a common NQl+Hh )Q+2K0l)K/0c8 /+
NK-*/ OlT)/8 -+/'Ksion, under which, upon the bankruptcy of either party,
the non-bankrupt counterparty can do three things: immediately terminate
the otherwise unexpired contract; liquidate any collateral securing the
obligation; and setoff any other outstanding contracts with the insolvent
party to yield a net position.20 As explained above, these rights are often
referred to collectively as Ncloseout netting.821
Bank insolvency law seeks to minimize the systemic effects of bank
failures by preventing bank runs. As such, it recognizes that the immediate
exercise of early termination rights by the counterparties of an insolvent
bank might exacerbate the systemic effect of bank insolvency in several
ways. Cash leaves the bank when parties exercise their rights to exit
through closeout netting. If these rights are exercised en masse upon
insolvency, the asset-depletion effect is the same as a bank run. In fact, it
probably increases the likelihood of a traditional bank run as news of the
failure of the bank leaks out. Moreover, if the bank is big and
20. These so-called Nwalkaway8 rights are not specifically addressed by the Bankruptcy Code,
but are explicitly covered by the one-day stay of the bank resolution process. See AM. BANKR.
INST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ABI COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, at 106
(2014) [hereinafter ABI COMMISSION REPORT].
21. See UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 1R2 (using the term Ncloseout netting8 to
describe any mechanism that gives rise to netting rights, whether automatically or by declaration,
upon the occurrence of a predefined event). Note, however, that there is nothing unusual about
these early termination rights. Almost every contract contains a so-called Nipso facto8 clause in the
boilerplate. The difference is that for all other contracts, the Bankruptcy Code makes those clauses
unenforceable. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(c), 365(c) (2012).
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interconnected with many other market participants, the effect of a single
failure can become systemic.
To address these concerns of rapid financial asset collapse, the FDIC
developed a method for preserving the integrity of a bank4s financial
contract portfolio while cushioning the effects of a single institution4s
failure on the banking system.22 The technique is familiar. When a bank
fails, the FDIC shuts it down,23 usually on Friday, and over the course of
the weekend the bank4s assets are identified as either Ngood8 or Nbad.8 The
good assets are transferred by sale to a solvent counterparty (usually
another bank),24 while the bad assets are held by the bank4s government
receiver.25 During the short period of transitionPeither the weekend, or the
weekend plus one to two business daysPearly termination rights are
suspended.26 Then, if the contracts are transferred to a solvent counterparty
before the stay expires, the termination rights remain in abeyance so long as
the counterparty performs its obligations under the contract.27 A run is
thereby prevented, and valuable financial contracts are preserved. This
same approach was extended beyond banks to cover SIFIs under Title II of
the Dodd-Frank Act with the creation of the OLA.28 Extending the bank
resolution approach to SIFIs was not just an endorsement of the efficacy of
winding up failed banks while preserving financial contract value, but also
a recognition that the regulatory restriction of this regime to banks alone
was under-inclusive.
To be sure, the FDIC approach necessarily delays the exercise of early
termination rights by some counterparties, but the result is that the value of
the bank4s portfolio is protected, the nondebtor counterparty receives the
benefit of its bargain, and both the integrity of the banking system and the
stability of financial markets are preserved.29 Moreover, experience has
22. See Michael H. Krimminger, Adjusting the Rules: What Bankruptcy Reform Will Mean for
Financial Market Contracts, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Oct. 11, 2005),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2005/101105fyi.html (NThe FDIC4s power to transfer
[financial contracts] to another open bank or to an FDIC-owned bridge bank within a business day
after appointment of the FDIC as receiver allows the FDIC the flexibility to choose a resolution
strategy that may retain the value in a portfolio of [financial contracts] or maximize its value
through more gradual sale. In addition, a transfer of [financial contracts] to another bank or to a
bridge bank also may avoid the potential market disruption that could result from an immediate
liquidation of a large portfolio.8).
23. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(4)R(5).
24. Id. § 1821(n).
25. Id. § 1821(m).
26. Id. § 1821(e)(10)(B)(i).
27. Id. § 1821(e)(10)(B)(ii).
28. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 210, 124 Stat. 1376, 1460R1514 (2010) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 5381R5394 (2012)). Specifically, the stay is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(8)R(9).
29. Mark Roe and Stephen Adams have advocated for the implementation of a ten-day stay
(with judicial discretion to extend for another ten days) as a means to protect the value of the
debtor4s derivatives portfolio while simultaneously protecting the stability of the financial markets.
See Roe & Adams, supra note 18. We are sympathetic to this in principle but worry that for some
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shown that derivatives markets are not, and have not been, significantly
disrupted by the short stay that goes into effect when a bank fails. Thus, the
costs of the temporary delay appear to be offset by the benefit of preserving
a valuable portfolio of good contracts.30
B. THE BANKRUPTCY SAFEHARBORAPPROACH
1. The Safe Harbors and Their Justification
When financial contracts are held by entities that are neither banks nor
SIFIs, the Bankruptcy Code governs, with an approach that is quite
different from both the bank insolvency regime and bankruptcy4* /j0
treatment of ordinary contracts.
a. Ordinary Executory Contracts
For ordinary contracts, the Bankruptcy Code mirrors the bank
insolvency approach: there is no early termination because ipso facto
clauses are invalidated by statutory command,31 and any right to terminate
the contract, even if triggered before bankruptcy, is suspended by the
automatic stay until the debtor can decide whether to perform (assume) or
breach (reject) the contract.32 If the debtor decides to reject the contract, the
costs of breach are treated as a pre-petition claim entitled to the same pro
rata distribution as any other unsecured claim against the estate.33 This right
of the debtor to assume or reject a contract preserves valuable contracts for
the benefit of the estate, and the treatment of rejection as an unsecured
claim for breach damages equitably allocates the loss caused by default
with other pre-petition creditors.34 However, this creates a Nlimbo8 period,
while the debtor decides whether to assume or reject, during which the
nondebtor is uncertain of its treatment. The principal difference between the
treatment of ordinary contracts and financial contracts in bank insolvency
law is the potential length of the stay and the uncertainty that it creates.
The limbo period understandably frustrates counterparties to many
types of contracts. So, too, does the power of the debtor to cherry pickPto
pick and choose which contracts it will perform. Accordingly, the
Bankruptcy Code contains a number of exceptions and safeguards to protect
various types of contracts where a delay in assumption or rejection would
instruments a longer stay may be disruptive and, for reasons discussed below, judicial discretion
to extend the stay may limit the market stabilization effect of this approach.
30. In sum, this Article assumes that the value to be preserved by preventing intemperate
destruction of financial contracts offsets the costs of clearance delay on the particular instruments.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2012).
32. Id. § 365(a)R(d).
33. Id. § 365(g).
34. For a deeper discussion, see Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory
Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1989).
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cause a particular hardship. Commercial leases are an example of contracts
for which the debtor cannot just freely hoard the assumption option without
paying rent.35 The debtor must continue to perform in a Ntimely8 fashion if
it wants to preserve the lease; otherwise, automatic rejection provisions
come into play.36 Other contracts can be assumed by the debtor, but not
assigned to third parties, such as personal services contracts, where the fact
that the debtor will perform the contract itself is an essential part of the
deal.37 Still other types of contracts cannot even be assumed. Contracts to
lend money (financial accommodations) are an example, under the theory
that to force a lender to honor a pre-petition contract to lend money to a
bankrupt borrower would be perverse.38 Most importantly, however, in all
cases where a contract can be assumed and/or assigned by the debtor, the
counterparty is entitled to the benefit of its bargain. Specifically, the debtor
must cure any breach and give adequate assurance of future performance.39
b. Financial Contracts and the Safe Harbors
Financial contracts are perhaps the most extreme example of contracts
entitled to special treatment. Under the safe harbors of 11 U.S.C. §
362(h)(6), (7), (17), and 11 U.S.C. §§ 555 and 556, financial contracts may
not be assumed or assigned. More importantly, early termination rights are
neither suspended by the automatic stay nor Nundone8 by the ipso-facto-
clause invalidation power. Quite the opposite, closeout netting is permitted
unfettered by judicial intervention. Moreover, payments made in connection
with the closeout of these contracts are insulated from later avoidance under
Bankruptcy Code provisions designed to reverse certain pre-bankruptcy
transactions (unless they are the product of intentional fraud).40
The bankruptcy safe harbors, first added to the Bankruptcy Code in
1982 and expanded through 2005, 41 were thought necessary to address
potential systemic effects of the failure of a smallPor at least not
systemically significantPfinancial firm.42 The legislative history reflects
concern that the bankruptcy stay might disrupt the clearance of trades and
35. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 365(c).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 365(b)(1), (f)(2).
40. Id. § 546(e)R(g).
41. With the 1982 amendments, Congress expanded the safe harbors to include the liquidation
of derivatives contracts. Stockbroker-Commodity Broker Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,
Pub. L. No. 97-222, 96 Stat. 235 (1982) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) and adding §§ 555R556).
With the passage of BAPCPA, Congress continued this expansion by broadening the definitions
of certain financial instruments covered by the safe harbors, such as, Nsecurities contract,8
Ncommodities contract,8 Nforward contract,8 Nrepurchase agreement,8 and Nswap agreement.8 See
BAPCPA § 907, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(25), (53B), 741(7), 761(4).
42. In 1982, the types of contracts involved would only have been handled by a financial firm,
though later expansion of the scope of the safe harbors likely changed that.
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payments under derivatives and thereby render certain financial product
markets unstable.43 Specifically, there was perceived risk to the financial
system if trades or payments, clearing through a failed financial
intermediary, were stayed. This delay in clearance (clearance risk) could
endanger the stability of the affected product markets.44 For this reason, safe
harbors were first added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1982 for transactions
that were part of the securities clearance process itself and for certain
instruments that function as money substitutes.45 More transactions were
included in the scope of the safe harbors in 1984 and 1994, with a
significant expansion in the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.46
Each time, the justification (however attenuated it became) was the same:
reduction of systemic risk.47
Early termination and closeout netting are thought to serve an important
function in capital markets. Financial institutions may have a wide variety
of contracts with a particular counterparty, some of which are assets and
some liabilities depending on whether the instrument is in or out of the
money at any given moment. The exposure on and variability of any single
contract may be great, but when all the various contracts with a single
counterparty are netted, the exposure will usually be much smaller as the
gains and losses on individual contracts cancel out. This ability to net is
thought to reduce the amount of risk in the economy and concomitantly
43. See Stockbroker-Commodity Broker Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No.
97-222, 96 Stat. 235 (1982). See also In re Grafton Partners, 321 B.R. 527, 532R33 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2005) (Klein, J.) (NPublic Law 97-222 was a package of amendments designed to protect the
carefully-regulated mechanisms for clearing trades in securities and commodities in the public
markets from [the] dysfunction that could result from the automatic stay and from certain trustee
avoiding powers.8).
44. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1R2 (1982), quoted in In re Grafton Partners, 321 B.R. at 536.
The House Report states:
The commodities and securities markets operate through a complex system of accounts and
guarantees. Because of the structure of the clearing systems in these industries and the
sometimes volatile nature [of] the markets, certain protections are necessary to prevent the
insolvency of one commodity or security firm from spreading to other firms and possibly
threatening the collapse of the affected market. The Bankruptcy Code now expressly
provides certain protections to the commodities market to protect against such a Nripple
effect.8 One of the market protections presently contained in the Bankruptcy Code, for
example, prevents a trustee in bankruptcy from avoiding or setting aside, as a preferential
transfer, margin payments made to a commodity broker.
Id.
45. See In re Grafton Partners, 321 B.R. at 536 n.17 (summarizing legislative history of 1982
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code).
46. BAPCPA § 907, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(25), (53B), 741(7), 761(4).
47. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27), 546(e)R(g), 555R556, 559R561. For a more
complete discussion of the legislative history of the safe harbor expansion, see Charles Mooney,
The Bankruptcy Code1s Safe Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When Is
Safe Too Safe?, 49 TEX. INT4L L.J. 243, 247R52 (2014).
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increase the ability of financial institutions to lend. Early termination, thus,
reduces risk in the financial system by allowing such netting.48
2. The Costs of the Safe Harbor Approach
The price of this protection for financial market liquidity is the probable
failure of the debtor-firm.49 Any filer with substantial derivatives exposure
is likely to be subjected to a run on its implicated assets, unprotected by the
automatic stay. Early termination is thus frequently a death sentence as
counterparties flee, especially if their contracts are in the money or contain
a walkaway clause.50 Because of the safe harbors, bankruptcy4s protective
stay cannot halt the exodus. The justification for inflicting this cost on the
debtor is that the counterparties get paid and, hence, can continue to manage
their own derivatives portfolio as a net exposure. On the other hand, this
privileged treatment of financial counterparties increases the risk to
everyone else with a stake in the debtor by reallocating value away from the
unprivileged creditors and reducing any possibility of rescue. The implicit
premise of the Bankruptcy Code4s safe harbors is that this cost is tolerable
if the failing firm is not itself systemically important. In the case of SIFIs,
Dodd-Frank swoops in and the bank resolution regime applies as a backstop.
Reorganization of financial firms is therefore functionally impossible in
bankruptcy, and reorganization of nonfinancial firms with significant
derivatives exposure also may be endangered. Congress appears to have
made a policy decision that the otherwise rehabilitative goals of the
Bankruptcy Code have to take a back seat to preserving the liquidity of the
financial markets. These firms are collateral damage.
The Lehman bankruptcy showed the dark side to this approach. On the
eve of its bankruptcy, Lehman asked to be converted into a bank holding
company.51 It did this in part because it would have allowed access to the
Federal Reserve window for desperately needed financing. 52 Timothy
48. David Mengle, The Importance of Close-Out Netting 1R3 (Int4l Swaps & Derivatives
Ass4n, Research Notes No. 1, 2010). For a contrary analysis suggesting closeout netting may
magnify risk, see Mokal, supra note 15.
49. See Roe, supra note 15, at 553 (NPrior to its collapse, Lehman owed J.P. Morgan about $20
billion. Four days before Lehman4s bankruptcy, J.P. Morgan froze $17 billion of Lehman cash and
securities that J.P. Morgan held, and then demanded $5 billion more in collateral. . . . Because of
the exception from the Code4s automatic stay . . . J.P. Morgan could immediately liquidate the
collateral in Lehman4s bankruptcy.8).
50. Under a walkaway clause, an Nout of the money8 counterpart is excused from any payment
obligations at the time of termination. See ABI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 106.
51. Joe Nocera, Lehman Had to Die So Global Finance Could Live, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11,
2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/09/12/business/12nocera.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
52. See Frequently Asked Questions M Discount Window Lending Programs, FED. RES.
DISCOUNT WINDOW, https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/en/Frequently_Asked_Questions.aspx
(last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
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Geithner rejected this request.53 This refusal meant Lehman had to use
bankruptcy. Since Lehman was subject to the bankruptcy safe harbors,
closeout of its financial contracts was not stayed. The concomitant bank run
resulting from the exercise of early termination rights by counterparties led
to a significant reduction in the value of Lehman4s derivatives portfolio.
Lehman is now gone.54 By contrast, immediately after the Lehman failure,
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs became bank holding companies and,
with financing from various sources, survived.55 In sum, because Lehman
was forced to use traditional bankruptcy, the safe harbors prevented the
orderly transfer of its derivatives book.56 Had it been governed by FDIC-
like provisions, a better outcome might have been achieved.57
53. Id. (N[Lehman] proposed that it be allowed to become a bank holding company. . . . But
Timothy Geithner, then New York Fed president, now Treasury secretary, didn4t like the idea of
letting an investment bank become a bank holding company P so he said no.8); see also Jon
Hilsenrath, Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti, Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model,
Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2008),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122202739111460721 (discussing how after Lehman, other
investment banks were later treated as banks). To be clear, we are not saying the bank resolution
regime is generally more lenient than Chapter 11. On the contrary, bank resolution compels
liquidation of the failing bank or SIFI and is widely seen as tougher. See David Skeel, The New
Synthesis of Bank Regulation and Bankruptcy in the Dodd-Frank Era 13 (Research Handbook on
Corporate Bankruptcy Law, Barry Adler ed., Elgar Press, forthcoming 2015R2016) (on file with
authors) (NUnlike ordinary bank resolution, which permits the FDIC to reorganize a bank through
a 6conservatorship,4 Title II provides only for receivership, which in bank resolutions under the
FDI Act is nearly always used to liquidate the troubled bank.8). We are simply saying that, with
regard to treatment of financial contracts, the bank resolution regime would have been more
protective of value.
54. See Roe & Adams, supra note 18, at 21. (NAlvarez & Marsal, Lehman4s restructuring
advisor, estimated that the disorderly close-outs of Lehman4s derivative portfolio caused the
Lehman estate to lose at least $50 billion in portfolio value, and maybe more.8).
55. Hilsenrath, Paletta & Lucchetti, supra note 53. Dodd-Frank, in effect, now enacts this
change for all SIFIs.
56. This view is taken by Morrison, Roe & Sontchi in their article, Rolling Back the Repo Safe
Harbors, supra note 1, at 1029R30.
[B]y permitting counterparties to Nrun8 on failing institutions . . . the safe harbors accelerate
failure and exacerbate the risk of systemic collapse. This is a lesson of the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy: during the days preceding and following the filing, counterparties refused to
roll over repos (or demanded larger haircuts) and terminated other financial contracts en
masse, effectively draining Lehman of liquidity. Had Lehman not become so dependent on
safe-harbored reposPmore than one-third of its liabilities were said to be in repoPit might
have been better positioned to weather the crisis long enough for a more stable solution to
emerge.
Id. at 1030.
Others have argued that the safe harbors did limit contagion. Seth Grosshandler told Congress:
The effectiveness of the safe harbors in containing contagion was demonstrated during
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. None of Lehman Brothers4 counterparties (many
financial institutions among them) failed because of losses under Safe Harbored
Contracts with Lehman. Almost all counterparties exercised their safe-harbored rights
to terminate, net and exercise rights against collateral, with only approximately 3% of
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The Lehman experience has led commentators to suggest that
bankruptcy is not a congenial place to restructure financial firms.58 Title II
of Dodd-Frank responds to this problem partially by extending bank
insolvency-type treatment to SIFIs. 59 This solves the problem for those
institutions, but there is no guaranty that the relevant regulators have
identified all such institutions. If a large financial, or nonfinancial,
institution that the FDIC has not identified as a SIFI fails, it must file for
traditional bankruptcy and will be subject to the safe harbors. This means
that for these shadow-SIFIs, Dodd-Frank provides no protection to the
financial system. For example, the FDIC recently declared GE Capital
Corporation a SIFI. 60 The good news is that GE is now properly
characterized. The bad news is that it existed as a mischaracterized entity
for a significant period. There are certainly others.
Thus, the problematic treatment of financial contracts in bankruptcy
remains an issue for firms whose financial contracts may constitute an
important portion of their value. More troublingly, the failure of some of
these institutions may have systemic implications.
II. IMPLEMENTING SYMMETRIC TREATMENT OF
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS
After Lehman, a number of commentators (including one of us) have
suggested that the bankruptcy approach to financial contracts ought to be
adjusted to mirror the bank insolvency regime.61 In particular, a short stay
could apply to the closeout of financial contracts. In this Part we argue that
Lehman4s derivatives book remaining outstanding after three months following its
bankruptcy petition. If these counterparties were not protected by the safe harbors, these
positions would have been indefinitely frozen, causing potentially catastrophic capital
and liquidity implications for counterparties in addition to any losses under the
contracts.
Exploring Chapter 11 Reform: Corporate and Financial Institution Insolvencies; Treatment of
Derivatives, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust
Law of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (statement of Seth Grosshandler).
These two positions are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Certain financial contracts may merit
special treatment, but immediate exercise of early termination rights may not bePor may not have
beenPthe best choice. See also Roe, supra note 15 (discussing risk amplification); Roe & Adams
supra note 18, at 25 (advocating for implementation of a ten-day stay in bankruptcy).
57. Worse, because Lehman itself was a systemically important institution, the safe harbors
may have enhanced rather than limited systemic contagion, which is why Dodd-Frank created the
Orderly Liquidation Authority for SIFIs. See Roe, Morrison & Sontchi, supra note 1, at 1029R30.
58. See generally Roe & Adams, supra note 18 (discussing Lehman).
59. The resolution rules are set forth in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, entitled Orderly
Liquidation Authority (OLA). See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111R203, tit. II, 124 Stat. 1376,
1442 (2010).
60. There have been some encouraging developments in the FDIC4s recent focus on
designating new SIFIs. For example, recently GE Capital Corporation was declared a SIFI. See
FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, BASIS OF FSOC4S FINAL DETERMINATION REGARDING
GENERAL ELECTRIC CAPITALCORPORATION 1 (2013).
61. See Janger, supra note 17, at 223.
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such symmetric treatment could be implemented in a way that is both
sensitive to concerns about liquidity and allows for preservation of the
value of a firm4s derivatives portfolio (including the risk management
function of any hedges). It might also facilitate the rescue of the firm by
preventing a tremendous cash drain at the outset of the case.62 Symmetric
treatment is not as simple as just extending the short stay regime from
banking law into the Bankruptcy Code, however. Questions remain about
how to accomplish an orderly transfer in a short period of time, as well as
how to assure performance of contractual obligations during the stay and
after assumption and/or assignment. Thus, the remainder of this Article will
describe the nuts and bolts required for implementation of a short stay
regime in bankruptcy.
While the practical details may be complicated, the conceptual lynchpin
that anchors the enterprise is not: the debtor must provide the financial
contract counterparty with adequate assurance of performance.63 When any
contract is assumed in bankruptcy, the debtor cannot claim the benefit of
that contract without performing its obligations. Thus, for financial
contracts as well, the debtor must assure that the financial contract will be
performed (i.e., that the counterparty will receive the benefit of its bargain).
This principle is symmetric with bank K0*/H'Q0Th4* -+/)QT)K/0*a 3LQ0 the
FDIC stays early termination rights and transfers the contract, it also stands
behind the contract or ensures that somebody else will. In the absence of the
FDIC or a solvent substitute, derivatives counterparties are legitimately
concerned that they will be left high and dry. Having invested in a financial
contract with a once-solvent party, they suddenly find themselves facing
credit risk.
Bankruptcy4s current method for protecting nondebtor parties to
financial contracts, explained above, is one of self-help: the safe harbors
give the counterparties the right to insist on immediate payment as a way of
looking out for themselves. However, as also explained above, that is a
potentially costly approach. Accordingly, so long as the debtor can assure
the counterparty the benefit of its bargainPas we will discuss below, either
by assigning the contract to a solvent counterparty or by providing a credit
enhancement from a creditworthy institutionPa better approach might be to
suspend early termination during a short stay pending assumption and
assignment. If a derivatives counterparty can be provided with adequate
assurance that the obligation under the derivative will be performed, there is
no reason to grant it additional exit rights by allowing immediate closeout
netting.
62. The debtor would still need to perform its obligations under the contracts as they came due,
but it would be freed of the threat of early termination.
63. As discussed below, care must be taken in identifying the contracts that are entitled to
special treatment, but analyzing the policy bases for singling out particular types of contracts for
that special treatment is beyond the scope of this Article.
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The steps to achieving both market stability and value preservation are:
(1) to define the class of contracts entitled to the special treatment; (2) to
identify the contracts entered into by the debtor that satisfy those
definitions; (3) to require that the obligations under the contract be
performed while the termination rights are temporarily suspended during
the short stay; and (4) to ensure that adequate assurance of future
performance is provided when the contracts are ultimately assumed and/or
assigned. We address each step in turn.
A. CLEAR LEGISLATIVEDEFINITIONS OF !ELIGIBLE FINANCIAL
CONTRACTS"
In bank insolvency, all contracts receive the same treatment, namely, a
short stay of early termination and closeout netting, followed by suspension
of those rights for contracts that are assumed by the solvent transferee who
continues to perform. To import this approach into bankruptcy, it is
necessary to decide which types of contracts should be entitled to this
special short-stay treatment. This is preferably a legislative, rather than
judicial, question, and it must be asked with careful attention to scope and
clarity. Much has been written elsewhere about the problematic definitions
of safe-harbored contracts under the current Bankruptcy Code. For example,
the definition of Nsettlement payment,8 it has been argued, can be read to
include the ordinary payments on the contract for the purchase of a bar and
grill (even if the payments are in nonpublic stock).64 In addition, the safe
harbor O/+ Nsecurities contracts8 has been held to include the typed
statements of accounts provided to investors in the Madoff Ponzi scheme.65
The broad, malleable definitions in current law can give sophisticated
parties the option to create bankruptcy-remote transactions wholly divorced
from the underlying justifications for the safe harbors.
This loose drafting has led to myriad recommendations to narrow the
scope of the safe harbors.66 As a policy matter, we agree that the rationale
for exempting particular types of contracts ought to be based upon clearly
identified and empirically grounded systemic-risk concerns that inhere in
the type of instrument or the nature of the parties to the contract.67 More
64. In In re MacMenamin4s Grill, Ltd., 450 B.R. 414, 425 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), Judge
Drain sought to exclude these payments from safe harbored treatment by noting that they were
payments to the ultimate beneficiary of a private transaction, not Nfinancial markets8 transactions
with systemic risk implications. After Enron and Madoff, however, it seems unlikely that this is
still good law, at least in the Second Circuit. See In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 773 F.3d
411 (2d Cir. 2014); In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., 651 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2011).
65. Madoff, 773 F.3d at 418.
66. See generally Morrison, Roe & Sontchi, supra note 1 (critiquing safe harbors for repos
with volatile collateral); ABI COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20.
67. The World Bank recently adopted its best practice standard C10.4 to reflect this view.
WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITOR/DEBTOR RIGHTS
SYSTEMS C10.4, at 21 (2015) [hereinafter WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES]. We applaud this move.
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importantly, as a practical matter, and for reasons set out in the next Subpart,
the transactions subject to special treatment must be easy to identify and
characterize. This clarity is necessary not just for purposes of financial
transparency, but also because decisions about their treatment will have to
be made quickly during the pendency of the short stay. More broadly, the
list needs to be sufficiently stable to be relied upon by financial market
investors. Thus, our first step is to recommend, as a substantive requirement,
)LQ Q*)lkHK*L2Q0) /O THQl+Hh SQOK0QS *Q) /O NQHKMKkHQ OK0l0TKlH T/0)+lT)*8
subject to the special short-stay treatment in bankruptcy.
B. EXPEDITED JUDICIALASSESSMENT OF !ELIGIBLE FINANCIAL
CONTRACTS"
Eligibility for special treatment is a legislative judgment that turns on
the nature of the instrument and its effect on financial markets, not the
intent of the parties. Parties put labels on contracts all the time to secure
favorable bankruptcy treatment, but characterization of a contract by the
parties as an Neligible financial contract8 does not necessarily make it so.68
There must be some judicial opportunity to monitor compliance with
whatever classification is deployed. In the absence of a stay, there is no
such opportunity, because any judicial review would be well after the fact.
As Judge Peck fairly complained, for example, in Lehman, the closeout of
financial contracts happened immediately and effectively without judicial
scrutiny because of the safe harbors.69 The first procedural requirement,
therefore, is to give the bankruptcy court an opportunity to ensure that
contracts are properly characterized as eligible for the shortened stay.
68. As we have noted, the class of safe harbored contracts may, under current law, be
overbroad, and without a doubt, the statute is not clearly drafted. Fixing these problems is beyond
the scope of this Article. Imposition of a short stay would have to satisfy a baseline resistance in
bankruptcy to accord special treatment to creditors in violation of the system4s strong equality
norms, but also confront the sense of entitlement current safe harbor creditors likely feel to avoid
any stay at allPas soon as they can get their lawyer to file a motion. Compounding this difficulty
is the collateral but essential question of properly defining the scope of which contracts are
allowed this exceptional treatment. Current bankruptcy law is criticized as getting that cut wrong
and so may need some modification. Whatever the optimal definition is, we know one thing that
will not work: party self-declaration. See Darrell Duffie & David Skeel, A Dialogue on the Costs
and Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements 17R23 (Univ. of Pa.
Law Sch.: Legal Scholarship Repository, Paper No. 386, 2012),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1385&context=faculty_scholarship
(discussing various theories on which financial contracts should and should not be subject to the
safe harbor provisions).
69. See Hon. James M. Peck et al., The Long and Short of It M Financial Engineering Meets
Chapter 11, Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges (Oct.
14, 2011); see also Hon. James M. Peck, Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts: Lessons
for Developing and Emerging Markets, World Bank Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes
Task Force Meetings (Jan. 11, 2011)
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGILD/Resources/WB_TF_2011_Bankruptcy_Treatment_o
f_Financial_Contracts.pdf.
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This threshold requirement raises its own complications, however,
because subjecting financial contracts to bankruptcy court jurisdiction
might itself have Nsystemic8 consequences. Any indication that a
bankruptcy judge might stay termination of a contractPfor whatever length
of timePraises concerns about value.70 Contracts that clear automatically
are priced differently (i.e., more favorably to the borrower) from contracts
where clearance may be delayed. Collateral also may be volatile, and
contracts may move in to or out of the money. If the debtor is allowed to
Nuse8 the collateral, that collateral might dissipate or at the very least
deteriorate. Also, delay itself has costs. How much delay is too much and
how much uncertainty the markets can tolerate are difficult empirical
questions.
Luckily, there is data. While we do not know how much time or
uncertainty markets will tolerate, we do know that financial markets can
and do handle the short, defined delay associated with bank resolution.
Herein lies the simplicity of symmetric treatment. It does not ask market
participants to face an unknown risk. In other words, if the outer bounds of
the delay are congruent with the short stay in bank resolution, there should
be no additional market disruption beyond what we have seen with banks.71
Thus, bankruptcy can craft a solution to this problem by using the bank
resolution approach as an outside limit. Just as the FDIC has a weekend
plus one-business day to sort a bank4s assets into good and bad, form a
bridge bank, and find an appropriate assignee, so too would a bankruptcy
judge face the same constraint.72
The time horizon, however, is just one consideration. The second is the
role of a jurist with discretion. Markets can more readily Nprice8 a fixed
interval of known duration than an indeterminate delay.73 Accordingly, the
stay should be not just short, but nondiscretionary. That is, the stay must lift
at the end of the defined period automatically, regardless of whether the
financial contracts were transferred (unless, of course, within the defined
70. One popular derivatives handbook advises financial risk managers that securing safe
harbor treatment is a top priority for handling counterparty risk. See PHILIP M. JOHNSON,
DERIVATIVES: A MANAGER4S GUIDE TO THE WORLD4S MOST POWERFUL FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS 47 (1999).
71. There is neither a fixed number of banks and SIFIs nor a static allocation of institutions
kQ)jQQ0 )LQ ]pZ!`=W# +QMK2Q l0S kl0I+(-)Th4* *lOQ Ll+k/+ +QMK2Qa 50SQ+ T(++Q0) Hljc K) K*
uncertain whether a firm is a SIFI, and even if it is a SIFI, it is up to the FDIC to determine
whether it will be resolved in bankruptcy or under the OLA. We therefore fail to see how the
market would be adversely affected by extending the short stay regime to cover financial contract
debtors who use the bankruptcy system. Indeed, such symmetric treatment might prove cost-
reducing in pricing contracts, ensuring that like instruments would receive the same insolvency
treatment regardless of counterparty.
72. Recall that the one-business-day stay of the bank resolution process is nondiscretionary
and becomes effective immediately upon the appointment of a receiver. FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. §
1821(e)(10)(B)(i) (2012).
73. More precisely, pricing an indefinite delay is likely to be so complex that it would chill the
market.
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period, the court declares the particular instruments as not properly
characterized as Neligible financial contracts8). The court will not have a lot
of time, and the stakes are high, but no higher than in bank resolution.
Within the assigned period, the debtor and the court would need to identify
any mischaracterized contracts and accomplish the transfer to a solvent
counterparty. However, seasoned bankruptcy practitioners and judges are
more than used to fast timeframes. Many cases are prepackaged, and few
bankruptcy cases arrive on the courthouse steps without significant advance
planning. Thus, the second step of our proposal involves a short, fixed
-Q+K/S fjLKTL 2l)TLQ* )LQ kl0I K0*/H'Q0Th +QMK2Q4* K0)Q+'lHe S(+K0M jLKTL
the financial contracts portfolio can both be adjudicated for proper
classification and transferred to an appropriate assignee.
C. TIMELY PERFORMANCE OFOBLIGATIONS # SHORT-TERM
LIQUIDITY
The symmetric approach strives to maintain market stability
notwithstanding bankruptcy. Therefore, counterparties must be assured that,
as a practical matter, bankruptcy is not synonymous with nonperformance.
The quid pro quo for nonenforcement of early termination or bankruptcy
default clauses is that the filing of bankruptcy will not lead to abrogation of
the contract. To justify the suspension of early termination rights, the debtor
must continue to perform its obligations under the financial contracts, just
as is done in the bank and SIFI regimes. 74 Some financial contracts
contemplate periodic payments, and some may close out by their own terms
during the suspension period. These ordinary course payments should be
allowed to continue, even during the short stay, pending transfer.
Note that this treatment is not permitted for ordinary executory
contracts in bankruptcy; pre-petition debt is not paid post-petition unless the
contract is assumed.75 Failure to perform will not deprive the debtor of the
ability to cure any default and assume the contract.76 For financial contracts,
however, such a limbo period, where the status of the contract is uncertain
and no payments are being made,77 could be problematic, because such
74. This is true both in the bank insolvency regime and under the European Union Collateral
Directive. See FIN. STABILITY BD., KEYATTRIBUTES, supra note 2, sec. 4.2 (NSubject to adequate
safeguards, entry into resolution and the exercise of any resolution powers should not trigger
statutory or contractual set-off rights, or constitute an event that entitles any counterparty of the
firm in resolution to exercise contractual acceleration or early termination rights provided the
substantive obligations under the contract continue to be performed.8).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (2012).
76. Id. § 365(b).
77. N[The Bankruptcy] Code is silent on the rights and obligations of the parties to an
executory contract during the limbo periodPthat is, the period between the filing of the petition
and the time of assumption or rejection.8 In re Nat4l Steel Corp., 316 B.R. 287, 305 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2004) (quoting GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 247 §
5.04(e) (5th ed. 2004)).
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uncertainty would be anathema to counterparties needing to know their cash
positions and exposures on a current basis. Symmetric treatment would thus
require that the obligations under the contract be performed in the ordinary
course, notwithstanding the shortening of the automatic stay.78
The harder question is where the debtor will get the liquidity to make
these ordinary course payments. Here, we think the bankruptcy regime has
robust experience at incentivizing capital infusions to failing debtors,
through section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code and its provisions for so-called
NDIP8 financing. The Code provides generous legal protections to a DIP
lender, and debtors rarely file for bankruptcy without having identified a
source of post-petition liquidity. There is no reason, at least conceptually,
why a DIP lender could not, on the first day of the case, announce that it
was backstopping the debtor4s financial contracts. Instead of allowing early
termination by the nondebtor counterparty, the Bankruptcy Code could
allow the debtor to perform its obligations in the ordinary course and
require the nondebtor to accept that performance in the absence of a
monetary breach. Indeed, it would be as if there were no breach of contract
in the first place and hence no basis for termination.
During the short stay, while the identity of the assignee is uncertain
and/or the assignment is still pending, the DIP facility could handle the
demands of ordinary course closeout of contracts, as well as the periodic
payments required under some swaps during the period prior to transfer.
This may seem like a huge additional expense until one recognizes that
most financial firms try to build a balanced derivatives portfolio. For many
debtors, the net exposure of the derivatives portfolio should be relatively
small. This should also be true for nonfinancial firms that are using their
swaps or derivatives to hedge other risks in their businesses. For example,
an airline will hedge the price of jet fuel, or a snack food company might
hedge the price of corn sweetener. Just as a firm may conclude that, on
balance, it is in the best interest of the business to pay critical vendors, it
may similarly conclude that it makes sense to continue managing the
derivatives portfolio in the ordinary course. So, while the nominal (gross)
exposure may seem quite large, so long as early termination rights are
stayed, the daily swings should be manageable.
78. This treatment is not unusual in bankruptcy cases. Where a debtor seeks to preserve a
business relationship, be it an executory contract (see 11 U.S.C. § 365), a supplier relationship
(see In re Tropical Sportswear Int4l Corp., 320 B.R. 15, 20 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (permitting
partial payment of pre-petition debt to a critical vendor)), or a credit facility (see In Re Michael
Day Enter., No. 09-55159, 2009 WL 7195491, at *7R8 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2009)
(permitting roll-up of lender4s pre-petition debt into post-petition DIP loan)), courts have
generally allowed the debtor to cure defaults and perform obligations in a timely fashion, even
where this is not expressly authorized by statute. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir.
2004) (leaving open the possibility that a bankruptcy court may grant a critical vendor motion
under § 363(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code despite an apparent lack of express authority under §
105(a)).
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At first, memories of 2008 may make this idea seem whimsical. Where
Lehman was involved, no bank, or even syndicate, was big enough to
provide financing.79 However, this may not always be the case. Indeed, after
Dodd-Frank, the remaining entities using bankruptcy to reorganize should,
by definition, not be systemically important. If they are systemically
significant, their failure should be dealt with under Dodd-Frank, and
resolution under the OLA will be available as a backstop. Thus, unless there
has been an error in classification by the Treasury (hopefully a rare
occurrence),80 the DIP loan liquidity described above should not be beyond
the capacity of an ordinary lender. Therefore, and third, ordinary course
payments should be permitted during the short stay.
D. ADEQUATEASSURANCE OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE #
ACCEPTABLEASSIGNEES ANDCREDIT ENHANCEMENT
As mentioned above, the quid pro quo for temporarily suspending the
contractual right to terminate is ensuring that the nondebtor counterparty
receives the benefit of its bargain. This raises a second, perhaps more
complicated, issue: the need to identify a suitable transferee who is prepared
and qualified to assume the debtor4s obligations on the contract. In the bank
insolvency regime, the FDIC simply sells the assets to another solvent
bank.81 In bankruptcy there is no agency to arrange and facilitate such a
transfer. Thus, providing adequate assurance of future performance entails
at least two requirements: (1) identifying an acceptable transferee; and (2)
facilitating the transfer, perhaps through the issuance of a sweetener or
credit enhancement.
1. Assignee Criteria
The process of finding an appropriate and willing assignee of the
financial contracts that is acceptable to the nondebtor counterparty may not
be simple. Thus, in order to make a transfer work within a short timeframe,
easily ascertainable criteria of assignee acceptability are a necessity. These
criteria might be stated in a pre-published list of acceptable counterparties
or in terms of a minimum bond rating of the proposed assignee. Either way,
the criteria would need to be dealt with in advance by legislation, regulation,
79. See generally STEVEN RATTNER, OVERHAUL: AN INSIDER4S ACCOUNT OF THE OBAMA
ADMINISTRATION4S EMERGENCY RESCUE OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY (2011) (addressing freeze of
DIP financing market during financial crisis).
80. We recognize that we have earlier expressed concern over the accuracy in classifying
SIFIs, see supra, text accompanying note 60 (observing foot-dragging in recognizing GE Capital
l* l 9Z]Zec k() jQ kQHKQ'Q SQk)/+* )Ll) l+Q N)// kKM )/ pZ<8 l+Q HKIQHh )/ kQ 9Z]Z* l* jQHHa
81. See RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 9c l) @ fN3LQ0 l0 ]pZ!-insured financial
institution is about to fail, the FDIC takes immediate action to resolve it by selling the franchise of
the failing institutionPK)* SQ-/*K)*c k+l0TL H/Tl)K/0*c l0S l**Q)*a8e.
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contract, or perhaps even court rule, so that the eligibility of a transferee, to
the greatest extent possible, can be immediately determined.
2. Assignment # Credit Enhancements
Once the pool of eligible assignees has been determined, it is still
necessary to find a willing purchaser. Finding a willing purchaser may
require financial enticement. Even if a willing assignee can be identified, it
might be only partially willing (i.e., unable or unwilling to take on all of the
risk of the portfolio). Some forms of credit enhancement might therefore be
necessary in order to give the portfolio risk attributes that are attractive to
the market.82
The key lies in the assurance of future performance. Indeed, when a
debtor files for bankruptcy it chooses which commercial relationships to
retain and which to abandon. If the relationship is, on balance, of value to
the estate, the debtor will elect to perform its obligations in order to obtain
the benefit of return performance. This is the logic of section 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which grants a debtor the option to pick and choose its
desired executory contracts. The debtor is of course required to cure all
defaults before it can assume, and must also give assurance of future
performance. This approach is similar to the one followed, as a practical
matter, with regard to critical vendors, key employees, and others.83 There
is no conceptual reason it could not similarly be applied to financial
contracts.
For these financial contracts, the lynchpin to performance is financing.
One possible solution to this problem might be to construct a standby credit
facility to underwrite the performance of the transferee, funded by the DIP
lender. As mentioned just above, DIP lenders operate as the source of
liquidity during bankruptcy. They approve expenses that are deemed to be
in the estate4s best interest. When the debtor seeks to pay critical vendors,
the DIP lender loans the money. When the debtor seeks to assume a
contract, the DIP lender may lend the cure payments.84 Accordingly, just as
the DIP financing order can be used to guaranty liquidity during the period
prior to transfer, it might, in some circumstances, also provide a necessary
credit enhancement as a two-fold sweetener. First, the debtor-funded
enhancement will thicken the pool of putative assignees, who might see
82. Id. l) G@ fNAn optional shared loss [Purchase and Assumption] is a resolution transaction
where the FDIC, as receiver, agrees to share losses on certain types of assets with the [Acquiring
Institution]. . . . During the most recent crisis, the FDIC has offered loss share where the
[Acquiring Institution] accepts 20 percent of the losses, or more, depending on the bida8ea
83. Some contracts, such as a contract to lend money, are not assumable, 11 U.S.C. §
365(c)(2), but that is not the issue with a repo, for example, where the money has already been
lent.
84. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter
11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS CGGc CGC fF__?e fNWith respect to creditor control, several papers have
documented the frequency of in-bankruptcy lines of credit (DIP financing) during the 1990s.8ea
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some in-the-money potential of the portfolio but nonetheless remain skittish
about incurring the risk. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
financial backstop will assuage the contract counterparty that a new,
unknown assignee will itself be able to perform.
Of course, in some cases, the purchaser/transferee of a debtor4s
financial contracts will be sufficiently creditworthy to satisfy the hedge
counterparties by reputation alone. If not, however, then just as the DIP
financing order might provide liquidity prior to transfer, the DIP lender
might find it worthwhile to provide a standby credit facility to ensure that
the financial obligations of the contract will be covered by the transferee.
Again, assuming a DIP lender who sees value in the continued operations of
the debtor, the need for government intervention is unlikely for all but the
very largest institutions, which should ideally fall under the SIFI regime
already. Thus, and finally, the DIP lender might backstop adequate
assurance of future performance, ensure the nondebtor counterparty the
benefit of its bargain, and eliminate the justification for early termination.
III. TRANSFER VERSUS ASSUMPTION
While the foregoing list of requirements sketches the basic contours of
how financial contract symmetry could be achieved in bankruptcy, an
important difference between bank insolvency and bankruptcy persists.
Namely, in bank insolvency, the institution is resolved or liquidated.85 The
assets that can be sold are sold, hopefully in a way that preserves value, and
the assets that cannot be sold are resolved by the FDIC. In bankruptcy,
however, the debtor may continue in business, perhaps in modified form,
discharging its pre-petition liabilities pursuant to the plan of reorganization
and honoring its post-petition liabilities on a current basis.86 This creates a
survival possibility that does not exist with banks that never Nemerge8 from
FDIC resolution.
Accordingly, in bankruptcy, it may be in the creditor4s best interests for
a debtor with a good businessPperhaps swept under by a liquidity
crunchPto continue its operations. When the business includes derivatives
as investments or hedges, the debtor may wish to assume its derivative book
and continue to perform its obligations. To the extent that these derivatives
were being used as hedges against business risks that continue during
reorganization, the debtor may well want to continue that operational hedge.
Again, an airline, for example, might wish to keep its jet fuel hedges in
place, or the snack food manufacturer may not wish to be exposed suddenly
to price fluctuations in corn. So long as the obligations continue to be
85. Compare the Bankruptcy Code4s Chapter 11 reorganization process, 11 U.S.C. § 109(b),
with the compelled liquidation of FDICIA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m)R(n) (2012), the Orderly
Liquidation Authority, 12 U.S.C. § 5390, and 12 U.S.C. § 5394.
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
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performed, and the DIP lender stands behind the contracts, there seems to
be no reason to allow early termination; the debtor should be allowed to
assume its financial contracts.87
CONCLUSION
The modified bankruptcy regime contemplated above seeks to mirror
the bank insolvency regime with regard to quick, orderly transfer of
financial contracts to a solvent assignee or, in appropriate cases, assumption
by the debtor over the period of a short stay that suspends early termination
rights. Suspension of those rights, however, should not occur without
adequate assurance of future performance. This can be provided either by
the creditworthiness of the transferee itself or by credit enhancements that
may be implemented through the debtor4s DIP loan. Accordingly, the
following specific changes to the Bankruptcy Code are recommended:
i. First, a short stay should be added to the safe harbors.
Instead of exempting financial contracts from the
automatic stay altogether, they should be subject to a
short stay that will lift automatically after a defined
period, whether or not a transfer of the derivatives book
has been accomplished.
ii. Second, the definition of Neligible financial contracts8
should be clarified, both so that the systemic reason for
special treatment is well understood and justified, and
so that the covered contracts can be easily identified
when challenged during the short stay period.
iii. Third, the bankruptcy court should be given the power
to deny short-stay treatment if an instrument is not
properly characterized as an Neligible financial
contract,8 but only if the determination is made within
the short, fixed period.
iv. Fourth, bankruptcy management powers should be
clarified to enable the debtor to make payments on
financial contracts in the ordinary course. Any
necessary financing for liquidity to effect this could
come from the DIP facility, repayment of which could
be accorded the same, or even higher priority to the
DIP loan. This backstop would assuage skittish
financial counterparties.
87. One possibility might be to make obligations under financial contracts of equal or senior
priority to the DIP loan. This, in essence, would mean that a debtor could not reorganize unless
the DIP was prepared to stand behind the financial contracts. Debtors who complain that this
could crush reorganization prospects by making DIP financing unattainable can be reminded that
the alternative is unilateral early termination and closeout.
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v. Fifth, section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code should allow
for the assumption of financial contracts, provided that
the debtor continues to perform its obligations in a
timely fashion and cures any non-ipso-facto defaults.
vi. Sixth, Nadequate assurance of future performance8
provisions need to be clearly defined to more easily
identify acceptable transferees for financial contracts.
Bond ratings, pre-certification registers and the like
could be deployed as screening mechanisms here.
Adequate assurance could be provided either by the
transferee itself or through a credit enhancement
provided by the DIP lender.88
These comparatively modest changes could implement the basic
concept of ensuring derivatives counterparties the benefits of their bargains,
notwithstanding bankruptcy, in exchange for a short delay in their netting
rights. At the same time, these changes would recognize the need for special
treatment of particular classes of financial contracts in the name of financial
market stability. It is therefore essential that the category of safe-harbored
instruments be well defined, easily identifiable, and limited to financial
instruments whose importance to the financial system justifies the special
treatment.
The debate surrounding the bankruptcy safe harbors for derivatives has
been heated. Some take the view that the bankruptcy safe harbors should be
repealed wholesale. Others take the view that doing so would trigger a
financial Armageddon.89 While we see the current incarnation of the safe
harbors as anachronistic and poorly drafted, we have accepted, for the
purposes of argument, that certain financial instruments serve as money
substitutes or have other attributes that make their immediate clearance
essential to the financial markets. Whatever the importance of that
necessary speed, however, financial markets currently tolerate short,
defined delays in clearance where bank failures are involved. The short
delay in the bank insolvency regime has allowed for the orderly transfer of
financial contract portfolios to solvent counterparties, thereby preserving
the value of those portfolios to the economy and the failing firm.
These observations are not unique to us, and they have generated a
number of proposals for the short stay to be adopted in bankruptcy.90 We
agree, and have sought to take the next step, proposing how the Bankruptcy
Code could be changed to implement transfer or assumption during a short
stay. We borrow a page from the Dodd-Frank playbook, which implicitly
88. This might be too detailed for statutory treatment, so perhaps U.S. Trustee administrative
guidance could suffice.
89. This debate is reviewed in Mokal, supra note 15.
90. See, e.g., Roe & Adams, supra note 18.
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recognizes the need for some stay assistance to protect SIFIs. But even for
SIFIs, some additional legislation within the Bankruptcy Code may be
required (a topic tangential to the scope of this Article but worth a quick
detour). The FDIC appears to favor a so-called Nsingle point of entry8
(SPOE) approach to reorganizing SIFIs in bankruptcy.91 In fact, a number
of bills are pending in Congress to help implement such an approach.92
Under such a strategy, the breadth of the safe harbors may cause problems.
The premise of SPOE is that a financial firm should be restructured by
resolving the holding company in bankruptcy while leaving the various
subsidiaries outside bankruptcy. Recapitalization of the firm is to be
accomplished through a bail-in of debt at the holding company level that
would then provide needed liquidity to the subsidiaries. One assumption of
the SPOE approach is that any financial contracts will be governed by the
so-called International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
Resolution Stay Protocol. Under the Resolution Stay Protocol, all financial
contracts are subject to a short stay as a matter of contract. The key point
here is that it is assumed that the subsidiaries would continue to perform all
of their obligations, including their obligations under financial contracts,
and that any transfer of the contracts to a bridge or trust entity would occur
within the stay period, thus avoiding the early termination of any financial
contracts. The problem, however, is that the Bankruptcy Code4s definition
of safe-harbored contracts is not limited to derivatives that are subject to the
stay protocol. It is, therefore, possible to imagine that the holding company
might be an obligor on safe harbored contracts, or that cross-default
provisions might trigger early termination rights that are not subject to the
stay protocol. In either of these situations, an inability to handle the
financial contracts in an orderly fashion might be catastrophic for the
orderly recapitalization of the financial firm. Both bills currently pending in
Congress appear to recognize this and would legislate a forty-eight hour
stay, but this would apply only to covered financial institutions. These
lacunae provide yet another reason why the flexibility of a legislated short
stay, coupled with the possibility of assuming financial contracts, could
reduce rather than increase systemic risk, and we see little reason for
91. See Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Board Releases Resolution Strategy for
Public Comment (December 10, 2013), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/pr13112.html.
92. The House Judiciary Committee recently voted H.R. 2947, The Financial Institution
Bankruptcy Act of 2015, out of Committee, and a bill to create a special Chapter 14 for financial
firms is currently pending in the Senate. See H.R.2947 M Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of
2015, U.S. CONGRESS, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2947/all-
actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22bankruptcy+financial%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=1
&overview=closed (last visited Mar. 6, 2016); S. 1861: Taxpayer Protection and Responsible
Resolution Act, U.S. CONGRESS, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1861/text (last
visited Mar. 6, 2016). Both bills propose a two-day stay on early termination rights along the lines
discussed here. It should be noted, however, that these bills only apply to financial firms that are
regulated by the Federal Reserve.
2015] Implementing Symmetric Treatment 181
treating financial contracts held by financial institutions differently from
other enterprises.
In sum, and to restate one final time, our symmetric approach is
premised upon both continued performance, during the stay, of any
obligations under the financial contract and adequate assurance of future
performance by the debtor upon assumption or transfer. Assuring, or even
permitting, such performance may not be a simple statutory task. As a
practical solution, we have suggested the DIP lender might be called on to
provide liquidity and credit enhancement where necessary. This treatment is
not, in the end, significantly different from the treatment of critical vendors
or other essential contracting parties well familiar in bankruptcy.93 In short,
orderly transfer or assumption of financial contracts will be possible for
many debtors, where transfer is feasible, and may, at the risk of ending on a
melodramatic note, make the difference between life and death.
93. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
